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Abstract
While several privacy protection techniques are pre-
sented in the literature, they are not complemented with
an established objective evaluation method for their assess-
ment and comparison. This paper proposes an annotation-
free evaluation method that assesses the two key aspects of
privacy protection that are privacy and utility. Unlike some
existing methods, the proposed method does not rely on the
use of subjective judgements and does not assume a spe-
cific target type in the image data. The privacy aspect is
quantified as an appearance similarity and the utility aspect
is measured as a structural similarity between the original
raw image data and the privacy-protected image data. We
performed an extensive experimentation using six challeng-
ing datasets (including two new ones) to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the evaluation method by providing a per-
formance comparison of four state-of-the-art privacy pro-
tection techniques.
1. Introduction
With the increasing use of the surveillance applica-
tions in public places [11], the need of protecting the pri-
vacy of individuals is also growing [8, 25]. Privacy pro-
tection may involve hiding or masking out image regions
that would otherwise reveal object identity. Several privacy
protection techniques have been presented in the literature
[5, 10, 12, 16, 20]. These techniques essentially apply dif-
ferent image filtering operations to provide a different level
of identity protection [25].
While evaluation criteria exist for assessing methods in
other areas of computer vision including optical flow esti-
mation [6], stereo correspondence estimation [22] and video
tracking [15, 17], there is an absence of an established
method for the performance evaluation of different aspects
of privacy protection methods. Some works exist that used
subjective methods for evaluating privacy protection tech-
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Figure 1. Proposed method for objectively evaluating a privacy
protection technique in the context of video tracking by quanti-
fying the privacy and utility aspects.
niques [7, 13, 21]. Boyle et al. [7] presented a methodology
that involved applying global (full-frame) privacy protec-
tion on a set of video sequences and showing them to sub-
jects, and in turn assessing the privacy protection techniques
based on the collected subjects’ responses using question-
naires. Saini et al. [21] and Korshunov et al. [13] also used
a similar subjective methodology except that they applied
privacy protection locally (only on sensitive image regions)
in video sequences. The performance evaluation based on
the above methods rely on subjective judgements and hence
could lack objectivity. An evaluation framework was pro-
posed that did not rely on subjective judgement and used
the face detection and face recognition accuracies on the
privacy-protected data as measures of the privacy protec-
tion [14]. While an interesting contribution, this framework
is target-dependent (i.e. aimed at image data with face tar-
gets) and depends also on the performance of detection and
recognition algorithms used.
To objectively1 evaluate a privacy protection method the
two key aspects to consider are as follows [10, 21]: first,
a quantification of the extent of identity information hid-
den by it that is the privacy; second, a quantification of
the preservation of the behavioral and structural informa-
tion that is the utility. An ideal privacy protection technique
may aim to maximize the privacy as well as the utility.
This paper presents an evaluation method (Fig. 1) for ob-
1Here the term ‘objective’ means the non-reliance of an evaluation
method on subjective judgements.
1
jectively assessing the privacy and utility aspects of the pri-
vacy protection techniques. The evaluation method is tar-
get independent and annotation free. Privacy is measured
by quantifying the appearance similarity between the orig-
inal and privacy-protected image data. Utility is measured
by quantifying the structural similarity between the origi-
nal and privacy-protected image data. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed evaluation criteria with an ex-
tensive experimentation by assessing and comparing four
privacy protection techniques in the context of video track-
ing on six challenging datasets (including two new ones).
2. Problem definition
Consider a video sequence V consisting of K frames:
V = ( fk)Kk=1, where fk denotes the frame k. Let X be
a set of trajectories (or tracks) estimated by a tracker in
V : X = {X j}Jj=1, where J is the total number of esti-
mated trajectories. X j is the estimated trajectory for tar-
get j: X j = (Xk, j)
k jend
k=k jstart
, where k jstart and k
j
end are the
first and final frame numbers of X j, respectively. Xk, j =
(xk, j,yk, j,Ak, j, l j), where (xk, j,yk, j) and Ak, j denote the po-
sition and the occupied area information of target j on
the image plane and l j defines its ID. Without the loss
of generality Ak, j is considered in the form of a bound-
ing box in which case Xk, j can be re-written as: Xk, j =
(xk, j,yk, j,wk, j,hk, j, l j), where wk, j and hk, j denote the width
and height of the bounding box for target j at fk. The num-
ber of estimated targets at fk is denoted as nk, which are
defined as {Xk,1, . . . ,Xk, j, . . . ,Xk,nk}. Let Bk, j denotes the
image data within the bounding box Xk, j. Bk is the set
containing the image data within all the bounding boxes
in fk: Bk = {Bk,1, . . . ,Bk, j, . . . ,Bk,nk}. Let B′k, j denotes the
privacy-protected image data obtained by applying a pri-
vacy protection method on Bk, j. Therefore, B′k is the set
containing the privacy-protected image data within all the
bounding boxes in fk: B′k = {B′k,1, . . . ,B′k, j, . . . ,B′k,nk}. The
evaluation procedure compares B′k with respect to Bk, the
original unprotected data, to assess the privacy protection
method under consideration in the form of a score, Sk, at fk.
3. Evaluation method
The proposed evaluation method is aimed to assess the
two key aspects of privacy protection that are privacy and
utility. Unlike [7, 13, 21] the method does not rely on
subjective judgement. Additionally, unike [14] the method
does not require the application of privacy protection meth-
ods on an image data with a particular target type. More-
over, the method is annotation free.
Privacy is assessed in terms of the appearance similarity
between Bk and B′k. A smaller appearance similarity be-
tween Bk and B′k alludes to a greater impact of the applied
privacy protection. For quantifying the appearance similar-
ity we use the widely-used Bhattacharyya distance that is a
metric (unlike the Kullback-Leibler divergence that is non-
symmetric and hence not a metric) and does not assume the
same variance for Bk, j and B′k, j (which Mahalanobis dis-
tance does). At frame k we compute the amount of achieved
privacy, Pk, in B′k as follows:
Pk =
1
nk
nk
∑
j=1
Dk, j(qBk, j ,q
B′k, j), (1)
where Dk, j(qBk, j ,q
B′k, j) is the Bhattacharyya dis-
tance at frame k between the probability distribu-
tions (normalized histograms) of Bk, j, qBk, j , and B′k, j,
qB
′
k, j . Dk, j(qBk, j ,q
B′k, j) =
√
1−BCk, j(qBk, j ,qB
′
k, j):
where the Bhattacharyya coefficient
BCk, j(qBk, j ,q
B′k, j) = ∑Zz=0 q
Bk, j(z)qB
′
k, j(z). Z = 255
as we use 255 bins (which is equal to the number
of intensity levels) in computing the normalized his-
tograms for Bk, j and B′k, j. In the case of RGB image,
Dk, j(·) =
√
D2k, j,red(·)+D2k, j,green(·)+D2k, j,blue(·):
D2k, j,red(·), D2k, j,green(·) and D2k, j,blue(·) are the Bhat-
tacharyya distances between the corresponding probability
distributions of the red, green and blue channels of Bk, j
and B′k, j. Pk ≥ 0: the higher Pk the greater the amount of
achieved privacy. While the computation of Pk enables
analyzing the achieved privacy at each frame, to facilitate
the performance comparison between different privacy
protection methods we provide the overall achieved privacy,
P, in the form of a single score as follows:
P =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
Pk. (2)
Utility is quantified in terms of the structural similarity
between Bk and B′k. A smaller structural similarity refers
to a lower preservation of structural information. For com-
puting the structural similarity between Bk, j and B′k, j we use
the well-known Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [23] that
was also employed in [9, 10]. At frame k the utility, Uk, is
computed as follows:
Uk =
1
nk
nk
∑
j=1
MSSIMk, j(Bk, j,B′k, j), (3)
where MSSIMk, j(Bk, j,B′k, j) is the mean SSIM value
between Bk, j and B′k, j for a variation of local windows [23].
MSSIMk, j(Bk, j,B′k, j) =
1
M ∑
M
m=1 SSIM
m
k, j(Bk, j,B
′
k, j),
where SSIMmk, j(Bk, j,B
′
k, j) is the SSIM value
for mth window and is given as follows [23]:
SSIMmk, j(Bk, j,B
′
k, j) =
(2 mµBk, j
mµB′k, j
+C1)(2 mσBk, jB′k, j
+C2)
(mµ2Bk, j+
mµ2
B′k, j
+C1)(mσ2Bk, j+
mσ2
B′k, j
+C1)
.
Table 1. Summary of the datasets. Key. K: number of frames;
Occ: occlusion; SC: scale changes; IC: illumination changes; Cr:
crowdedness; PC: pose changes.
Dataset K Frame size Target type Challenges
ETH Bahnhof 999 480 × 640 Person Occ, SC, IC, Cr
ETH Sunnyday 354 480 × 640 Person Occ, SC, IC, Cr
iLids Easy 5220 576 × 720 Person Occ, SC, IC
PETS 2000 160 576 × 768 Vehicle SC, PC
OKG 243 960×1280 Vehicle SC, PC
CAST 150 960×1280 Vehicle SC, PC
SSIM is computed on grey-scale data [23] such that mµBk, j
and mµB′k, j are the mean intensity values, and
mσBk, j and
mσB′k, j are the standard deviations in Bk, j and B
′
k, j, respec-
tively, for the local window m; mσBk, jB′k, j is the correlation
coefficient; and C1 and C2 are the constants. Uk ∈ [0,1]:
the higher Uk the larger the utility retained. For the reason
described in the computation of P (Eq. 2) we compute the
overall retained utility, U, in the form of a single score as
follows:
U =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
Uk. (4)
4. Experimental validation and analysis
We use six challenging datasets in experiments (Table
1). Among the datasets, four are well known and publicly
available including ETH Bahnhof [1], ETH Sunnyday [1],
iLids Easy [3] and PETS 2000 [4]. The other two are new
and recorded outside the OKG nuclear power plant site in
Sweden and in a Centre for Applied Science and Technol-
ogy (CAST) site in UK under the EU project: P5 [2]. The
datasets contain the full-person body and the vehicle as tar-
get types. ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday and iLids Easy
contain multiple targets and we use tracking results from a
multi-target tracker [19] in these scenes. PETS 2000, OKG
and CAST contain a single target and we generated tracking
results using a single-target tracker [18] in these scenes.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evalu-
ation criteria by evaluating and comparing four well-known
privacy protection methods including cartooning, blurring,
pixelating and blanking. Cartooning involves applying an
initial blurring on the input image data followed by mean-
shift filtering and edge recovery using the already generated
gradient mask with sobel edge detector [10]. The kernel
size at the initial blurring stage (A) and the spatial radius
(sp) and color radius (sr) at the mean-shift filtering stage are
given as follows [10]: Ai = [i ·Aorig/50]; spi = [i ·sporig/50];
sri = [i · srorig/50]; where i is the filter intensity: i ∈ [1,100]
and the parameters Aorig = 7, sporig = 20 and srorig = 40
[10]. Additionally, as done in [10], for establishing some
correspondence and a fair comparison among different tech-
niques the kernel size used in the case of blurring and pix-
elating for a particular filter intensity, i, is equal to spi as
defined above for cartooning. Blanking completely masks
out the privacy-sensitive information in the image data. We
therefore apply each privacy protection technique on the
tracking results in all datasets for a full variation of filter
intensity, i; of course blanking remains unaffected over a
variation of i. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 plot the privacy (P) and util-
ity (U) scores, respectively, of the four privacy protection
techniques for a variation of i on all datasets. Fig. 4 shows
some sample qualitative results for the privacy protection
techniques on all datasets with an increasing i.
The trends of the privacy scores (P) obtained by the four
techniques over a variation of i are similar across all datasets
(Fig. 2). Expectedly, on all datasets blanking provides
the highest privacy (highest P) as it masks out the entire
information in the image data (Fig. 4). Among the re-
maining methods, pixelating consistently obtain the high-
est P followed by blurring and cartooning on all datasets
for the entire variation of i as shown in Fig. 2 (note that
for i ∈ [1,3], P = 0 for blurring and pixelating because ac-
cording to the equation of spi their kernel size is 1×1 thus
leaving the image data unaltered by these two methods).
Interestingly, the ranking trend of pixelating, blurring and
cartooning techniques in terms of their privacy scores over
a variation of i is similar to that reported in [10] (the authors
of [10] used however a different dataset to show the results).
As in the case of P scores the trends of the utility scores
(U) obtained by the four methods over a variation of i are
also alike across all datasets (Fig. 3). Blanking, which
consistently achieves the highest privacy, provides the least
utility (smallest U) due to a total loss of structural informa-
tion. Cartooning, on the other hand, preserves the structural
information better than the rest of the methods (Fig. 4).
Indeed, on all datasets cartooning shows the highest U for
the entire variation of i followed by blurring and pixelating,
which corresponds to the conclusions made in [10].
Indeed, the aim for a privacy protection technique would
be to provide an appropriate trade off between U and P. To
this end in Fig. 5 we also plot U (as computed in Fig. 3) vs.
P (as computed in Fig. 2) on all datasets. U vs. P plot would
be desirable for choosing among different privacy protec-
tion techniques for a specific application. For example, for
a specific application on ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday and
iLids Easy (Fig. 5(a-c)), for a desired P = 0.60 pixelating
would be the best choice as it provides the highest U. Like-
wise, on OKG, CAST and PETS 2000 (Fig. 5(d-f)), for a
desired P = 0.26 cartooning would be the best choice due
to the highest U. In general pixelating is found to provide
a better trade off between U and P on datasets with person
target (Fig. 5(a-c)), and cartooning provides a better trade
off on datasets with vehicle target (Fig. 5(d-f)). We also
checked the statistical significance of the P and U scores
obtained by the four privacy protection methods using the
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Figure 2. Privacy score (P) obtained by different privacy protection techniques for a variation of filter intensity on all datasets.
Welch ANOVA test [24]. Statistical significance is achieved
at the standard 5% significance level both for the case of P
and U scores on each dataset.
5. Conclusions
We presented an annotation-free and target-independent
evaluation method for objectively assessing privacy protec-
tion techniques. The evaluation method assesses privacy
by measuring the Bhattacharyya distance-based appearance
similarity and utility by quantifying the SSIM-based struc-
tural similarity between the original image data and the
privacy-protected image data. Through an extensive ex-
perimentation on six datasets (including two new ones) we
showed the usefulness of the proposed evaluation method
by providing a statistically-significant comparison of four
privacy protection techniques: blanking, blurring, pixelat-
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Figure 3. Utility score (U) obtained by different privacy protection techniques for a variation of filter intensity on all datasets.
Original Blanking Blurring Pixelating Cartooning
(a) ETH Bahnhof dataset [Filter intensity: i = 20]
(b) ETH Sunnyday dataset [Filter intensity: i = 30]
(c) iLids Easy dataset [Filter intensity: i = 40]
(d) OKG dataset [Filter intensity: i = 50]
(e) CAST dataset [Filter intensity: i = 60]
(f) PETS 2000 dataset [Filter intensity: i = 70]
Figure 4. Sample qualitative results for different privacy protection techniques on all datasets with an increasing filter intensity (i =
20,30,40,50,60,70). Column 1: original frame; column 2: blanking; column 3: blurring; column 4: pixelating; column 5: cartooning.
ing and cartooning. Blanking is not desirable in general
because it results in a complete loss of visual (and hence
the structural) information thus providing a very low util-
ity. Among the remaining techniques, pixelating achieves a
higher privacy and cartooning provides a higher utility over
a variation of filter intensity. Moreover, pixelating and car-
tooning are generally found to provide a better trade off be-
tween utility and privacy on datasets with person and vehi-
cle targets, respectively. Finally, in this study we evaluated
the privacy protection techniques by applying them locally
only on the estimated target bounding boxes. The proposed
method is indeed generic and could also be used for evalu-
ating a globally-applied privacy protection.
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